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Between November 4, 2011 and March 26, 2012, this site served as an infoportal regarding a war-crimes process against a number of Swedish cabinet members, MPS, and armed forces personnel.

Today the site serves as a memorial documenting the process of how a number of individuals completely avoided legal responsibility.

The site is also a memorial over Swedish media-blackout regarding:

  • How Sweden as a mamber of the so-called “West” in six months reduced the most successful and humane nation in Africa in to a Hell-hole currently under the nominal control of terrorist-designated warlords.
  • How some seven hundred Swedish citizens filed charges against their own government, parliament and armed forces.
Click here for a list of the suspects.
Click here for an overview of the process.
Click here far a background article on Libya.
Click here for an article on the UN.

 

Twenty-nine cabinet members, two-hundred and forty MPs and four military commanders reported for war crimes in Libya 2011

Click here to see the suspects..

November 4, 2011

The International Prosecution Chamber in Stockholm

Box 70296
107 22 Stockholm
SWEDEN

Report on serious offences subject to public prosecution

The offences include violations of international law,1 genocide,2 terrorism,3 and financing of terrorism.4

Background

Until March 2011 Libya was a sovereign secular state, ranked by the United Nations as a “High Human Development” country in a global context5 (HDI ranking 53 out 194, ahead of countries like Russia and Brazil) and the most advanced country on the continent of Africa.6 As late as Jan 4, 2011 – just weeks before the war started – several UN members applauded Libya’s continued commitment to upholding human rights.7

Today, seven months later, Libya has – as a result of decisions and actions by individuals i.a. within the Swedish government and Sweden’s military forces – been turned into a bombed out war zone with up to a million refugees8 under the control of a “National Transitional Council” (NTC) which is in the process of turning Libya into a theocracy regulated by Islamic Sharia law.9



The leadership and cadre of the NTC rebels are dominated by past and present members10 of designated terrorist organizations11 such as Al-Qaeda (AQ, AQI, AQIM)12 and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).13

The council is presently headed by a de facto triumvirate – holding executive/financial/military power:

  1. Mahmoud Jibril – a university lecturer educated, and for several years resident, in the US and whose studies was mentored by a renowned CIA case officer working for CIA in Iran during the CIA/staged coup there in 1953.14
  2. An American economics professor by the name of Ali Tarhouni.15
  3. A senior Al-Qaeda asset/educator/leader previously operating in Afghanistan and Iraq but who currently acts under the name of Bel Hadj as the Commander in Chief for the NTC as well as military dictator of Tripoli.16

On March 19, 2011, two days after the adoption of UN resolution 1973, this NTC/Al-Qaeda/LIFG rebel council announced the creation of a new central bank and a new oil company.17 Starting a “revolution” with the creation of new central bank may be a possible “first” in world history and casts the long shadow of as yet unidentified international financial actors over the war against Libya.18

The war

The pretext and framework for the attack on Libya by Sweden and other countries was United Nations resolution 1973. This resolution i.a. authorized a ban on flights and measures “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” whilst excluding “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”.19

The reality is that participants in the NATO-led war already at the outset was in violation of resolution 1973 and that the motive was not to protect civilians – but regime-change.

Testimony by former NATO military commander General Wesley Clarke confirms that as early as 2001, Pentagon was instructed to prepare for war against Libya20 – i.e. long before Libya was reported as a “problem” somehow in need of a “solution”.

Thus, the backdrop carries distinct echoes of colonialism,21 spiced with the general geostrategical redrawing of the entire Middle-East set in motion by the attacks in the US on September 11, 200122 and envisaged by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC).23

The event that is said to have triggered NATO’s attack on Libya was the Libyan government’s own attempts to restore order and protect civilians in the Benghazi area, where an estimated one thousand jihadists24 (Al-Qaeda/LIFG) had stormed military storage facilities, and armed themselves and started to shoot up the neighbourhood.

Given the miniscule size and poor to non-existent training of this “rebel” contingent,25 the successful containment and disarmament of these rebels by the Libyan government should have been a foregone conclusion – had it not been for the intervention of French and subsequently US airpower on the side of these Al-Qaeda jihadists.26

Since March 31, 2011, NATO has conducted 9658 air strike sorties,27 averaging 46-47 strike missions per day for 207 days. When assessing the gravity of the war crimes reported here this massive air campaign needs to be contrasted against the realities on the ground.

What are these realities?

Even before UN resolution 1973 Libya was reported to have no effective air force.28 Moreover, and in regional terms, Libya did not have much of a military to speak of in the first place.

For example, indicated by the chart below is that whereas neighbouring countries in the first decade of the 21st century escalated their military expenditures – Libya did the opposite.29



In fact, Libya under Qaddafi, was a remarkably constructive factor in the region – being the founding father of the African Union.30

Reported war casualties vary widely.31 What is clear is that the involvement of the armed forces of Sweden and other countries not only changed the outcome of what would have been the orderly neutralization of a local fringe Al-Qaeda/LIFG flurry into a full-scale regime-change (for the worse) with a death toll, injured and refugees at a very different order of magnitude.

Some key-points:

  • The attack on Tripoli: There are reports that the NTC/Al-Qaeda/LIFG ground assault on Tripoli July 20, 2011, was amphibious (supported by NATO ships) and planned , directed and led by NATO-officers, also on the ground.32 The way in which the reportedly NATO-led rebels were at all able to progress through Tripoli was by NATO Apache attack helicopters strafing the streets to clear it of civilians.33
  • The attack on Sirte:34 Coordinated with NATO’s massive bombing campaign against the city were the rebels cordoning off, of it – preventing civilians attempting to escape the carnage from leaving.
    Why would the Swedish government, or any other government, for that matter, wish to prevent civilians from escaping an event that by observers have been likened with the town of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War?35
    The level of popular support enjoyed by the Qaddafi government, as reflected by the resistance of the inhabitants of i.a. Tripoli and Sirte, indicates that the Libyan people in vast numbers view the Qaddafi government as the only legitimate government.36
  • Genocide on black Libyans:37 Numerous reports exists on the apparent rascist agenda of the NTC/Al-Qaeda/LIFG rebel as they seek out and kill black people.38 Substantiated, as these reports are, the instigators of this as a generic policy in the war may not necessarily have been Al-Qaeda or the LIFG.
  • The role of NATO’s so-called Special Forces (SF) units: There also exists high-profile testimonies of how Danish and French SF-units engaged in and set up a policy of publicly decapitating black libyans in order to terrorize the civilian population of Tripoli into submission39 under the capital’s newly installed military dictator Bel Hadj.
  • The destruction of the Great Man-Made River project:40 NATO’s wholesale destruction of Lybia’s world-renowned Great Man-Made River project is a text-book example of crimes against international law. Not only did NATO destroy the world’s most advanced water project – it also destroyed the factories capable of repairing this vital civilian infrastructure.
  • Use of inhumane weapons such as depleted uranium41 and cluster bombs:42 Evidence points to the possibility of both cluster bombs and depleted uranium being used by NATO in Libya.
  • The foreign occupation force prohibited by UN resolution 1973 is in fact what the NATO-led war is all about, both tactically – with military ground force elements – and strategically – with the installation of a puppet terrorist-designated regime controlled by Anglo-American interests.

The offences

As a result of initiatives taken by members in the Swedish government, made possible by individuals in the Swedish parliament, and carried out by individuals in the Swedish military, the state of Sweden today shares responsibility for the transformation of the most humanitarian and successful state on the African continent into a third-world war zone run by a conglomerate of terrorist-designated rebels over which the agendas of Anglo-American intelligence and banking oligarchs cast their long shadow.

For more details on casualties, the destruction of civilian life, and civilian infrastructure brought by the military forces of Sweden and other countries, consider the Libya reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.43

Given existing international agreements and the clear violations committed by the participants of NATO’s Unified Protector campaign, of the intent and boundaries set by UN Resolution 1973, it is evident that crimes falling i.a. under the following categories have been and are being committed:

  1. War of aggression
  2. Crimes against humanity
  3. Genocide

These crimes were not the result of mission-drift or mission-swings – but were pre-mediated for the purpose of imposing regime-change in Libya in violation of international law.

Given the international consensus of the designation of i.a. Al-Qaeda and LIFG as “terrorists” it is also evident that the following crimes have been and are being committed by the individuals reported here:

  1. Terrorism
  2. Failure to report on Terrorism
  3. Support of Terrorism
  4. Financing of Terrorism

Dates and Periods:

  1. March 29, 2011 Cabinet Meeting44
  2. March 30, 2011 Start of Sweden’s military operation FL0145
  3. April 1, 2011 Parliament vote46
  4. June 9, 2011 Cabinet Meeting47
  5. June 17, 2011 Parliament vote48
  6. July 1, 2011 Start of Sweden’s military operation FL0249
  7. September 15, 2011 Cabinet Meeting50
  8. September 21, 2011 Parliament vote51

Suspects:





These MPs listed below voted in favor of the war at event 3 and later abstained:

Björlund, Torbjörn
Brink, Josefin *
Dinamarca, Rossana *
Johnson, Jacob
Linde, Hans *
Olofsson, Eva
Olsson, Lena
Persson, Kent
Sjöstedt, Jonas *
Lillemets, Annika *

Interviews with Brink, Dinamarca, Linde, Sjöstedt, and Lillemets (marked with * above) confirm that the reason for abstaining was the realization that the Swedish government was in violation of UN resolution 1973 in its participation of the NATO-led war.52

Key suspects in the Swedish military:



Reported individuals from Sweden’s military establishment include the chain of command from Commander-in-chief Sverker Göransson down to all personnel part of the FL01/FL02/infoop operations . This also includes any staff-members in Sweden involved in the planning, directing and execution of these operations, as well as possibly members of units such as Special Operations Group (SOG) and the parachute regiment at K3 and which may have been involved in the clandestine parts of the war against Libya in 2011 – including the atrocities reportedly committed by French and Danish SF units.

Attached:

  1. United Nations resolution 1973
  2. United Nation’s Human Development Report 2010
  3. Background paper: “How Al Qaeda men came to power in Libya”, Thierry Meyssan, Sep 7, 2011
  4. West Point study: “Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq” Dec 19, 2007
  5. Government Proposal: 2010/11:117 March 29, 2011
  6. Government Proposal: 2010/11:127 June 9, 2011
  7. Government Proposal: 2011/12:5 September 15, 2011
  8. Video depicting use of cluster bombs by aircrafts
  9. NTC Draft Constitutional Charter
  10. “Libya’s Lessons”, Ben Barry, Survival, vol. 53, issue 5. Summary of the war from a western perspective.
  11. Testimony former NATO Chief General Wesley Clarke March 2, 2007
  12. Testimony Lizzie Phelan, Oct 4, 2011
  13. Walter Fauntroy article, Sep 7, 2011
  14. The Sirte Declaration 1999.
  15. Rebuilding Americas Defenses, Project for a New American Century, 2000.

November 4, 2011


Kristoffer Hell Peter Pettersson
Yrsa Häggström Leif Erlingsson
Leif Bengtsson

 


1 Cf. Sweden’s Criminal Code and International Agreements (BrB and folkrättstraktat).
2 Cf.Sweden’s International Agreements (Sveriges överenskommelser med främmande makter 1952:68. FN resolution 260, 1948-12-09).
3 Cf. Law (2003:148) "om straff för terroristbrott". Cf. EU framework decision 2002/475/JHA 2002-06-13.
4 Cf. Law (2002:444) "om straff för finansiering av särskilt allvarlig brottslighet i vissa fall."
6 Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_African_countries_by_Human_Development_Index, 2011-10-22.
7 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review –Libyan Arab Jamahiriya "United Nations, A/HRC/16/15,2011-01-04.
11 AL-QA’IDA’S FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ – A FIRST LOOK AT THE SINJAR RECORDS, West Point, 2007 sikd 12 et al. The coastal area around and between the cities of Darna and Benghazi is the home base of the Al-Qaeda/LIFG rebels and have by West Point been labelled as a sort of global capital for Al-Qaeda, particularly in it’s recruitment for Al-Qaeda in Iraq. http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/2011/03/jihadis-who-killed-americans-get-us-support-libya, 2011-09-26. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/27/libyan-islamists-power-share-warning,2011-09-27.
15 The second most important post that of Finance and Oil is held by a Ali Tarhouni a Libyan national resident in Washington for the last 35 years: http://www.washington.edu/news/articles/uw-faculty-member-ali-tarhouni-named-finance-minister-by-libyan-opposition-1, 2011-10-20.
20 Testimony of General Wesley Clark, 2007-03-02 on Democracy Now!
22 9/11 – Synthetic Terror – Made in the USA, Webster Tarpley: Cf. http://www.bokus.com/bok/9780930852375/911-synthetic-terror/.
23 http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf, 2011-11-01.
24 Estimates reported ten days after the US launched Operation Odyssey Dawn suggested a thousand fighters, virtually all of which were other Jihadists. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/29/1000-freelance-jihadists-join-libyan-rebels/print/, 2011-10-21. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1103/30/ita.01.html, 2011-10-21. http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/libyas-rebel-forces-need-more-than-just-weapons/, 2011-10-21.
25 Estimates reported ten days after the US launched Operation Odyssey Dawn suggested a thousand fighters, virtually all of which were other Jihadists. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/29/1000-freelance-jihadists-join-libyan-rebels/print/, 2011-10-21. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1103/30/ita.01.html, 2011-10-21. http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/libyas-rebel-forces-need-more-than-just-weapons/, 2011-10-21.
26 "Libya’s Lessons", Survival, 53:5, Ben Barry 2011.
27 http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111024_111024-oup-update.pdf, 2011-10-27.
29 THE NORTH-AFRICAN MILITARY BALANCE, Anthony H. Cordesman, Aram Nerguizian CSIS, 2010.
30 http://www.africa-union.org/Docs_AUGovernment/decisions/Sirte_Declaration_1999.pdf, 2011-11-01.
34 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71994.htm, 2011-09-22. Details found under the heading "Key Hits 22 September" confirms that NATO air missions are in direct support of the Al-Qaeda/LIFG rebels in their attempts to capture Sirte. Cf. http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Aktuellt/centralanyheter/Libyeninsatsens-slutdatum-narmar-sig/ : even the media reporting by the Swedish military establishment confirms that Swedish units are acting in violation of UN resolution 1973: Generalmajor Mats Brindsjö: "Now we will fully start to focus on the mission of protecting civlians" ["Nu fokuserar vi helt på uppgiften att skydda civila"].
42 AFP: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJefXVG37Eo&feature=player_detailpage, 2011-10-27.
45 http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/flygvapenbloggen/2011/09/06/medaljering-av-fl-01/, 2011-09-24. According to this official Air Force blog entry, the Swedish war effort started just 23 hours after the Cabinet Meeting on March 29, 2011 – i.e. two days before the Parliament voted for it.
50 2011/12:5, 2011-09-15.
52 tel conversations 2011-09-28 to 2011-09-30.

 

Appeal I – AM-185260-11: the government, parliament and armed forces under reported for war crimes in Libya 2011

Dec 9, 2011

The International Prosecution Chamber in Stockholm

P.O. Box 70296
107 22 Stockholm
SWEDEN

Request for appeal/review of report on serious offences subject to public prosecution: AM-185260-11

On Nov 21, 2011, your office arrived at the decision that since "the reported events are not crimes"1 no investigation would be started.

We know them to be just that, horrendous crimes of tremendous public interest, and we urgently appeal and request a review of the decision.

There is a crime scene the combined size of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Greece.

Inside this crime scene one finds up to 150 thousand dead (current figure), a million refugees and a civilian national infrastructure bombed back several decades.

Why was the war against Libya a crime?

The NATO-led war against Libya was a war of aggression used as instrument for the national policy of some states to meddle in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose of regime-change . As such the war was a violation of the UN-charter and the Kellogg-Briand treaty and went way, way beyond what UN resolution 1973 allowed for (protection of civilian life and infrastructure).

It was also a war which saw systematic violations of the Geneva convention in its execution.2

  1. The Kellogg-Briand treaty declares wars as tools for national policy illegal.

    The treaty is still in force. Sweden is a signatory (SÖ 1929:23).3

  2. In case the prosecution chooses to ignore point 1 – the second reason why the
    war against Libya was a crime is that the UN-charter explicitly forbids the UN
    to meddle in the internal affairs of other states.4
  3. Libya was never considered a threat to other states, neither by the UN nor by NATO or any of the eighteen aggressor states, including Sweden. The only reason given for the war was unconfirmed concerns for civilian inside Libya.5

  4. In case the prosecution chooses to ignore points 1 and 2, the third reason why the war against Libya was a crime is that the only situation in which article 42 of the UN-charter can be invoked (cf. resolution 1973)  is if attempts to settle the issue with non-violent means has first been exhausted (article 41).6
  5. This step was skipped by the security council, by the eighteen aggressor states – including Sweden – and by NATO.7

  6. In case the prosecution chooses to ignore points 1, 2, and 3, the fourth reason the war against Libya was a crime is that even if resolution 1973 is accepted as valid, the war waged against Libya was, and is, a violation of what resolution 1973 allowed for – protection of civilian life and infrastructure.8

Who are those responsible in Sweden for the war crimes in Libya?

Given that the war was illegal and the existence of concepts such as "command responsibility",9 "shared responsibility", "common purpose",10 "joint enterprise",11 and more recently "Joint Criminal Enterprise"12 in International Law, all members of the Swedish armed forces part of the war effort as well as all cabinet members and member of parliaments directing Sweden’s armed forces to this war, are responsible for the war crimes committed by the NATO-war effort "Unified Protector" in total.

It does not matter if Swedish forces did, or did not, fire a single shot (or dropped a single bomb or fired a single rocket) – in anger. The fact that the government and parliament of Sweden directed the armed forces of Sweden to support others operating under the same NATO-command who did do this makes the government, parliament and armed forces of Sweden equally culpable.

If the prosecution fails to see the established legal connection of shared responsibility, then the prosecution needs to investigate the reality of i.a. which of the over 10 thousand strike sorties resulting in up to 150 thousand dead (latest known figure) and other casualties were made as the result of i.a. Swedish reconnaissance and information sharing – thus establishing the causal links, and not only the legal responsibility link, which is already there.

Finally, in the case the prosecution fails to grasp that the way the war was waged is evidence that the toppling of the Qaddafi-regime was the real, albeit hidden agenda – it is now directed the statements made by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt on his personal blog to understand the hidden agenda of regime-change.

Mar 21, 2011: Foreign Minister Carl Bildt comments on a meeting
with the EU Foreign Affairs council regarding the war in Libya:

".. we were in agreement that the most important and difficult are political actions to try to build a new functioning Libya after Qaddafi".13

There it is. For Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, regime-change was the purpose of resolution 1973 as it was taken – a position he held over a week before he would present the government proposition, he wrote himself, and in which he drags Sweden into an illegal war.14

However, neither Bildt’s proposition, nor resolution 1973, mention regime-change.

Mar 27, 2011: More self-incriminating statements by Carl Bildt:

"On Tuesday I will be in London for the big international conferences that will take place there in order to discuss the direction of the coming operations.

The UN’s Ban Ki-moon, the Arab League and hopefully also leaders from the African Union, will also be there.

I would like to see that the meetings focus more on the political and diplomatic efforts that will be required before and after direct military actions have come to an end.

It will then take a broad political process to lay prepare the ground for a unified Libya for the time after Qaddafi. The challenges then will hardly be less the they are now."15

Indicated by the last paragraph is Carl Bildt’s understanding the highly destructive nature of the recently started NATO-campaign as well as the true nature of the Al-Qaeda rebel council waiting in the wings.

Apr 11, 2011: Comment in relation to meetings with EU foreign ministers, NATO foreign ministers and representatives of the African Union:

"It is important that they are clear [on the point] that there is no future for Qaddafi and his closest family in Libya ['s political life."16

The reality that swims into focus here appears to be that Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt was a political driving force for regime-change also in an international context.

Who does this guy work for - Swedish tax-payers or a cabal of  foreign financial oligarchs?

Apr 30, 2011: More Carl Bildt:

"The Libyan operation with the pressure exerted on Qaddafi must of course continue until he is gone."17

If the prosecution is looking to identify the main culprit responsible for dragging Sweden into this illegal war, their best suspect may be Foreign Minister Carl Bildt.

Mar 30, 2011:  Carl Bildt on the depth of his personal involvement:

"Friday Morning the parliament will decide on the Libya-operation and as the minister responsible for the proposition I will of course be there to be part of that debate."18

Regarding the question of admissibility

Regarding the question of admissibility, raised by your office in a telephone conversation, here is our response:

Who paid for the war?

We did.

This is the fact, albeit no one in the government and parliament asked us before they joined in the seven month NATO-directed crime spree in North Africa - and doing so in our name.

This means that the prosecution not only has to start this investigation because it is of tremendous public interest. It also has to do it since most of the individuals making this report are taxpayers to the state of Sweden and thus unwitting parties/stake-holders to the reported war crimes by the actions of the government, parliament and armed forces of Sweden - as apparently initiated by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt under the aegis of Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt.

Regardless of the prosecution's decision to initiate an investigation (or not), we expect a detailed written deliberation on all the points above as well as the question of admissibility and the prosecution's view on the relationship (and the reason for this relationship) between the individuals calling for this investigation and the state of Sweden.

December 9, 2011

Kristoffer Hell
Peter Pettersson
Yrsa Häggström
Leif Erlingsson
Leif Bengtsson
Carl Lundström
Åse Pedersen
Jonathan Björklund
Haideh Åkesson
Ulf Bittner
Gunnar Nordin
Lennart Mogren
Hans Carlsson
Stefan Danerek
Arne Bengtsson
 Carl Hamilton
Einar Kjolaas
Marcus Borg
Johan Lindquist
Jan Wiklund
Rita Bardsäter
Ulla Johansson
Mikael Vatjus
Bengt Larsson
Jan-Åke Jönsson
Roland Holm
Björn Naess Johansen
Linus Abrahamson
Stig-Lennart Johansson
Stephan Markusson
Anders Paulsson
Dennis Zackrisson
Leo Holtter
Kalle Hellberg
Lukas Konrad Swenninger
Pia Hanzén
Einar Schlereth
Stefan Lundblad
Mattias Gyllenhak Liss
Patrique Ståhl Dordevic
Ann Hellberg
Brigitte Gustavsson
Snorre Lindquist
Simon Hansson
Torbjörn Rönnberg
Dick Österlund
Lars Lindeberg
Katarina Lindmark
Roland Nordlund
Thomas Schützer
Jakob Lipczynski
Lasse Wilhelmsson
Gabriel Amanatiadis
Lena Holfve
Johan Björnsson
Martin Dahr

 


[1] "Det förfarande som anmälts är inte brottsligt", Beslut 2011-11-21.<>
[2] cf. AM-185260-11, Nov 4, 2011.
[3] http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/treaties/TS1/1929/29, 2011-12-06.
[4] UN-charter, chapter I article 2, clause 7.
[5] cf. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UvgURDBx7X0, 2011-12-07.
[6] http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegal-use-of-force.php, 2011-11-30.
[7] http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegal-use-of-force.php, 2011-11-30.
[8] Cf. http://www.ui.se/blog/uibloggen/2011/9/21/said-mahmoudi-svarar-kjell-goldmann-om-folkratten-i-libyen-1.aspx, 2011-12-07; cf. http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegal-use-of-force.php, 2011-11-30; cf. AM-185260-11, Nov 4, 2011.
[9] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_responsibility, 2011-12-07.
[10] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_purpose, 2011-12-07.
[11] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_purpose, 2011-12-07.
[12] http://www.okobih.ba/files/docs/Jasmina_Pjanic_ENG_i_BHS.pdf, 2011-12-07. cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_criminal_enterprise, 2011-12-07.
[13] http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/fortfarande-inte-alldeles-klart/, 2011-12-07: "..vi var eniga om att viktigast och svårast är de politiska insatserna för att försöka att bygga ett fungerande Libyen efter Khaddafi."
[14] http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/03/30/snabb-ambassadinvigning/, 2011-12-07: "På fredag morgon skall riksdagen ta ställning till Libyen-insatsen, och som statsråd ansvarig för propositionen kommer jag självfallet att vara på plats för att delta i den debatten"
http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/03/27/varierande-vecka-kommer/, 2011-12-07: "På tisdag kommer jag så att befinna mig i London på de stora internationella sammandragningar som kommer att äga rum där för att diskutera inriktningen av de kommande insatserna. Dit kommer också FN:s Ban Ki-moon, Arabförbundet och förhoppningsvis också ledande företrädare för Afrikanska Unionen. Jag skulle gärna se att de mötena fokuserar mer på de politiska och diplomatiska ansträngningar som kommer att krävas inför och efter det att de direkta militära operationerna har kommit till sitt slut. Då kommer det att krävas en bred politisk process för att skapa förutsättningar för ett enat Libyen för tiden efter Khaddafi. Utmaningarna så kommer näppeligen att vara mindre än utmaningarna nu."
[16] http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/04/11/med-libyen-i-centrum/, 2011-12-07: "Det är viktigt att de är tydliga med att det inte finns någon framtid för Khaddafi och hans närmaste familj i Libyens politik."
[17] http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/04/, 2011-12-07: "Libyen-insatsen med trycket på Khaddafi måste självfallet fortsätta intill dess att han kommer bort."
[18] http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2011/03/30/snabb-ambassadinvigning/, 2011-12-07: "På fredag morgon skall riksdagen ta ställning till Libyen-insatsen, och som statsråd ansvarig för propositionen kommer jag självfallet att vara på plats för att delta i den debatten"

 

Follow-up questions re dismissal of request for a review of case AM-185260-11: the Government, Parliament, and Armed Forces [of Sweden] reported for war crimes in Libya

The questions were sent on Dec 30 and 31, 2011.

Click here for an overview of the process.

Re: “Dismissal of request for review of case AM-185260-11″

Dear prosecutors Häggström/Waldenström

Please find forwarded the questions one of us have put regarding your decision and rationale:

You have dismissed our request on the basis that we lack connection to the matter and as a result lack justified interest in a review.

As a response, allow me to put forward this. The majority of us who have reqested a review of the matter are Swedish citizens eligable to vote and who also pay taxes. Many are also liable for service in the [Swedish] military/civilian defence forces. As such we do have “a connection to the matter” in such a way that “a justified interest” for a review is present. Everything the state of Sweden does abroad is done in the name of and for the nation, i.e. on behalf of the citizens as well as being paid by the citizens. If the state of Sweden creates death and destruction in other countries the citizens of Sweden will carry the immediate costs and other consequences of this – for example the costs for caring for refugees from the destroyed country as well as potential acts of revenge from foreigners that have been affected. These circumstances (as well as possibly several other circumstances) do connect us to the matter.

Therefore, I demand four answers from yourselves:

  1. Your have received only name and residental addresses from us, the individuals filing these charges. In what way[s] have you investigated us when you arrived at the conclusion that none of us have sufficient connection and justified interest?
  2. What catgegory of Swedish persons would have the necessary connection to the matter? Are relatives of dead Swedish soldiers sufficiently connected to it?
  3. If Swedes (as participants on the winning side in the war) by you are not considered sufficiently connected to the outbreak of the war and the crimes committed by the attacking coalition, would it then be possible that persons from the loosing side (with or without Swedish citizenship) has sufficient connection to the matter?
  4. If your replis to questions 2 and 3 mean that neither any Swede nor any foreigner have sufficient connection to the matter I need a description from yourselves stipulating the type of person that do have sufficient connection.

With kind regards,

Carl Lundström

Allow me to conclude with a reflection made by another of us who filed these charges:

We now have the word from a senior government official that we, the citizens, have no relation to what the state does. This, truly, is a posture unseen [in this country] since the 18th century.

I CC in [prosecutor] Lise Tamm and the registrators so that this request is ensured a place in the diaries in order to allow scholars sometime in the future to learn how things worked in the early years of the 21st century.

Kind regards,

Kristoffer Hell

 

Appeal II – AM-185260-11: the government, parliament and armed forces of Sweden reported for war crimes in Libya 2011

February 10, 2012

The Prosecution Development Center Stockholm
Prosecutor Roger Waldenström

 

Re: ÅM 2011/8263 (AM-185260-11)

On November 4, 2011, a number of individuals inside the government, parliament and armed forces of Sweden were reported for war crimes in Libya.

During the seven rounds of dismissals and appeals that have followed, the following has become increasingly clear:

  1. The strength of the war crimes case:
    1. The clear identification of a Swedish cabinet member (Carl Bildt 490715-4613) as the ain suspect in having deceived the Parliament and possibly also the cabinet into a war with the ostensible motive of protecting civilians, but whose true objective all along, even before this minister authored the bill that was presented to the Parliament, was regime change – a measure never authorised by UN resolution 1973.
    2. After Sweden’s and NATO’s unprovoked attack on it, Libya has gone from being the most prosperous state in all of Africa (UN 2010) to a war zone with a reported one million refugees and 150 000 dead.1 It is today under the nominal control of terrorist designated organizations. Although a de facto civil war appear to rage between the various factions, the new contollers still find the means to send rebels to southern Turkey, from where they launch terrorist raids into Syria for the apparent purpose of toppling also that government.2
  2. A remarkable reluctance on the part of the public prosecutor to initiate the investigation into war crimes.

    This reluctance flies in the face of the fact that the prosecution by law is required to initiate such an investigation.3

  3. An apparently widespread lack of understanding among prosecutors as to which laws actually regulate their official work.
    In telephone conversations with three different prosecutors on January 16, 2012 (the Stockholm on-call prosecutor; Sweden’s Prosecutor-General; and the Prosecutor Development Center in Stockholm) revealed that none of them could answer question “a” below – or simply gave the absolutely wrong answer. In case “b” below, all replied, also erroneously, “no”:

    1. What is the legal definition of ‘plaintiff’?
    2. Is there a section in Swedish law that defines the relationship between those have reported these war crimes (Swedish citizens, registered voters, defence conscripts, and tax-payers) and the government of Sweden?

We now request that the prosecution / Prosecutor-General immediately launches the criminal investigation called for in the attached documentation.

Since there is a very strong public interest in the reported crimes being investigated it is incumbent with the prosecution to initiate such an investigation. To not do it, is tantamount to malpractice.3

This already already strong legal need is further strenghtened by the fact that we who have reported these war crimes also are plaintiffs.

This is so since everything that the government of Sweden did in Libya was done in our names with our money.

In case it has not yet become clear to the prosecution, the situation is that we who have made this report are deeply “offended” – to express it mildly – by the crimes the government, parliament and armed forces of Sweden in Libya in 2011.

RB 20:8

Plaintiff is a person against which a crime has been committed or who have been offended or suffered harm or loss by the crime.

Finally, as we who have reported the war crimes are the very same “people” mentioned in the Swedish Constitution (RF 1:1), the prosecution is recommended to start viewing this appeal as a direct instruction from their ultimate employers that time now has come to initiate this criminal investigation.

RF 1:1

All official power in Sweden emanates from the people.

Yours faithfully,

Kristoffer Hell
Peter Pettersson
Yrsa Häggström
Leif Erlingsson
Leif Bengtsson
Carl Lundström
Lena Holfve
Leo Holtter
Magnus Assarsson
Håkan Larsson
Lennart Sjöberg
Anders Paulsson,
Bengt Larsson
Ulla Johansson
Kjell Pedersson
Patrique Dordevic
Lennart Mogren
Mattias Gyllenhak Liss
Stefan Lundblad
Einar Schlereth
Ali Syed
Jayant Bäckström
Tiina Ronelöv
Jonathan Björklund
Sebastian Ward
Rita Bardsäter
Gabriel Amanatiadis
Sverker Ödesjö
Hans Carlsson
Robert Karlsson
Arne Bengtsson
Ingerun Osbakk
Björn Hanson
Stefan Danerek, Dr.
Brigitte Gustavsson
Karin Sundlöf
Bengt Israelsson
Gunnar Nordin
Anders Ankartjärn
Rita Bardsäter
Stella Lindblom
Sören Johansson
Thomas Schützer
Jakob Lipczynski
Stig-Lennart Johansson
Joel Osietzki
Brigitte Gustavsson
Sofie Rydelius

 


[1] For example, on Augusti 8-9, 2011, 85 non-combattants were killed by NATO bombing. 33 of these were children and 32 women. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=25966.
[2] http://www.voltairenet.org/Libyan-Islamists-go-to-Syria-to, 2012-01-17.
[3] http://www.aklagare.se/Aklagarens-roll/Atalsbeslutet/Atalsplikt/, Jan 21, 2012

 

Charges filed with the Parliamentary Obudsmen against the Swedish prosecution authority for i.a. negligence and misconduct when failing to initiate an investigation against cabinet members, MPs and military personell for war-crimes in Libya in 2011

17th March 2012

JO
Box 16327
103 26 Stockholm
SWEDEN

 

Report to the Parliamentary Obudsmen: negligence and misconduct for failing to initiate an investigation regarding war crimes

Suspects

Prosecutor-General’s office

Peter Lundkvist, acting Chief Prosecutor
Jenny Ahlner Wetterqvist, Prosecutor

Stockholm Development Center:

Thomas Häggström, Chief Prosecutor
Roger Waldenström, Prosecutor

The International Prosecution Chamber in Stockholm:

Lise Tamm, deputy Chief Prosecutor

 

Registration numbers

ÅM 2012/1211 (Prosecutor-General’s Office)
ÅM 2011/8263 (Stockholm Development Center)
AM-185260-11 (International Prosecution Chamber in Stockholm)

 

The process

On November 4, 2011, a number of cabinet members, MPs, and military personell war reported for various crimes against international law.

The background to the report was Sweden’s participation in the war against Libya in 2011

Seventeen days later, on November 21, 2011, deupty Chief Prosecutor Lise Tamm dismissed the report.

Her legal justification:

The reported event is not a crime.

The expediency with which the report was dismissed, without any explanation, indicates that Tamm may not have given the reported events the attention they required in order to be able to make an informed decision.

Why?

On December 9, 2011, a request for review of Tamm’s decision was filed. This time, the plaintiffs took it upon themselves to inform the prosecution of some of the provisions of the law surrounding the offenses, which the International Prosecution Chamber apparently “missed” the first time.

Three weeks later, on December 30, 2011, prosecutors Roger Waldenström and Thomas Häggström dismissed the request for a review on the grounds that those who reported the crimes were not plaintiffs and that there were no other reasons to launch an investigation.

Their decision was emailed to the plaintiffs.

One of the plaintiffs immediatelly replied and requested clarification on a number of points, one among them legal status of those that filed the reports (i.e. the plaintiffs).

Two weeks later a written response arrived. It did not answer a single one of the numbered questions raised.

On February 20, 2012 a second request for review was sent to prosecutors Waldenström/Häggström at the development center.

The request included references to provisions in the law which confirmed that those individuals who filed the report were also legal plaintiffs.

Thirteen days later acting Chief Prosecutor Peter Lundqvist and prosecutor Jenny Ahlner Wetterqvist at the Prosecutor-General’s Office dismissed this second request for review.

The sole explanation given for the dismissal was that the prosecution is unable to initiate investigations against cabinet members. Nothing was mentioned about the two other categories of suspects: military personell and MPs.

These thirteen days deserves to be compared the fourteen days it took deputy Chief Prosecutor Lise Tamm to dismiss the report the first time.

During these thirteen days, it was not (as in the case of Lise Tamm) one instance of Sweden’s Prosecution Authority that would process the report, but two: at first the development center, which had to consider the new information forwarded which confirmed the reporters to also be plaintiffs, and secondly, the Prosecutor-General’s Office – to which the case was brand new.

In this context, the second para under the heading “Background” [Bakgrund] in the Prosecutor-Generals decision raises questions. The para states that files have been available to the Office when it made itäs decision. Aside the question of what documents were actually in these files, the wording as such does not say whether or not the prosecutors at the office really read all the documentation.

All together, the question may very well be: did the staff at the Prosecutor-General’s Office even bother to read all the documentation before dismissing the report?

Misconduct/Negligence

The plaintiffs who now reports this to Sweden’s Parliamentary Ombudsmen believe a number of serious mistakes have been committed by the above mentioned prosecutors. Find below some of the more obvious. Perhaps the Parliamentary Ombudsmen will find others:

  1. The International Public Prosecutor’s Chamber: not to initiate an investigation. The time elapsed between when the initial report was received and when it was dismissed indicates that the report was never taken seriously and never really looked at.

    How does the prosecution chamber understand the term “duty to prosecute”?

    The International Public Prosecution Chamber in Stockholm is supposed to be specialized in investigating the types of crimes reported, yet the prosecutor in question cannot even bring herself to offer a few sentences, explaining why she dismisses the charges as reported.

  2. The Stockholm Development Center: to initially dismiss the request for a review on the basis not of a law, but a nebulous and contextually irrelevant reasoning found in a nearly twenty year old parlamentary budget proposal, followed by persisting with the dismissal of the report on the erroneous ground that the plaintiffs somehow are totally unrelated to the matter.

    The result of the last point is that this case has escalated enormously, from being a matter a crimes committed in a war in a foreign country, to a more timeless question of the relationship between a state and its citizens.

    Which is the relationship between the state and citizens in Sweden – really?

    Is it completely one-sided, to the state’s benefit? Are citizens only tax-cattle with obligations and no rights whatsoever?

    In clause one para one of the Swedish Constitution, it is declared that all public power is derived from the people. Still, Sweden’s Prosecution Authority persists with the idea that somehow the plaintiffs lack a legal connection to the humanitarian and geopolitcal disaster created – in the name of the plaintiffs – by the government of Sweden in Libya in 2011.

    We, the plaintiffs, see an enormous responsibility now resting with the Parlamentary Ombudsmen to investigate the very serious misconduct and negligence Sweden’s Prosecution Authoriy is guilty of in this case.

  3. The Prosecutor-General: To dismiss the application with a statement applicable to only one of the three groups reported, and remaining silent on all our points raised in our request for review.

    If the Prosecutor-General believes it is legally restrained from prosecuting Cabinet Members – what stops it from investigating the other two other reported categories: military personell and MPs.

In addition, the Prosecution Authority’s handling of the matter has been such that we feel misconduct is also the case wiht respect to Sweden’s Freedom of Information laws and the laws that regulate the level of service that cna be expected from government bodies.

We ask that when the Parlamentary Obudsmen starts its investigation, it does so with the understanding that it can itself launch criminal investigations against both the named individuals from the Prosecution Authority as well as the war crimes investigation initially called for.

Attachements:

  1. Report of serious crimes subject to public prosecution
  2. Decision, the International Prosecution Chamber in Stockholm
  3. Request for review
  4. Decision, the Stockholm Development Center
  5. Request for clarification
  6. Response to request for clarification
  7. Request for review
  8. Decision, Prosecutor-General
  9. Letter from one of the plaintiffs

Sincerely,

Kristoffer Hell
Johan Hansson
Simon Hansson
Johan Björnsson
Johan Westerholm
Lena Holfve
Pauli Terho
Thomas Johansson
Akasha Skaldeman
Björn Sveninge
Johan Lindqvist
Mikael Forsberg
Håkan Larsson
Mikael Vatjus
Ylva Runald
Patrique Dordevic
Mako Ishikawa
Jakob Gezelius
Lisa Carn
Peter Waher
Kristoffer Strutzenblad
Lars Pettersson
Tony Dahlgren
Felix Hendar
Bengt Larsson Kungsmad
Håkan Berggren
Markus Andersson
Mattias Gyllenhak Liss
Ove Mollvik
Peter K. Pettersson
Peter Harrysson
Agne Gralby
Carl Lundström
Rolf Andersson
Andreas Lovén
Lasse Wilhelmsson
Anders Paulsson
Linda Karlström
Sören Johansson
Armin Dee
Julian Jönsson
Sebastian Sjöberg
Gabriel Amanatiadis
Gunnar Nordin
Stefan Lundblad
Arne Bengtsson
Ross Mercke
Hans Persberger
Li Lörs
Sverker Odesjö
Rolf Sjöwall
Ergin Aris
Christer Andersson
Leif Erlingsson
Percy Andersson
Tobias Nilsson
Hans Carlsson
Camilla Hansson
Thomas Björling
Ingerun Osbakk
Sören Backman
Stig Engwall
Kjell Pedersson
Tiina Ronelöv
Jayant Bäckström
Johan Djupström
Kent Fredriksson
Kerstin Pettersson
Rita Bardsäter
Thomas Andersson
Mats Berglund
Yngve Appelblad
Roger Karlsson
Johan Sandwall
Hans Häggqvist
Jakob Lipczynski
Lennart Andersson
Birgitta Svedjot
Jan-Ola Gustavsson
Lars Lindeberg
Mattias Thidé
Carl Hamilton
Kent Strömbäck
David Ringstedt
Markus Påhlsson
Lars Dahlström

 

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